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The increasing use of referendums in contemporary societies raises several questions 
about their emergence. Among these, it is unclear why controversial and sensitive issues 
are subjected to popular vote. So far, limited research has investigated why referendums 
on interethnic relations are initiated. This article seeks to address this gap in the 
literature and analyzes these reasons by focusing on all five referendums called on 
interethnic relations in Central and Eastern Europe. These referendums are those 
organized in Estonia (1992), Latvia (1998 and 2012), Hungary (2004) and Slovenia 
(2004). The findings of our qualitative analysis reveal that the initiators were driven 
either by agenda-setting or policy legitimation incentives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Referendums reflecting on ethnic and political identities are quite popular in Europe. Since 2014, four 
such votes took place to demand for either independence (Scotland 2014, Catalonia 2017) or change of 
status (Crimea 2014, Brexit 2017). These examples are only the tip of the iceberg, the continent having 
a rich tradition of ethno-based referendums in the last three decades. The emergence of countries 
following the disintegration of former federations, the accession to the European Union of several 
countries, peace agreements, regional autonomy demands, the settlement of territorial disputes or 
citizenship laws were the general categories covered by referendums with an ethnic component. When 
dealing with these categories, earlier studies have focused on the normative debates surrounding them, 
the importance of context in the decision-making process, the cues provided by the parties involved in 
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campaigns, the key determinants for why people supported one of the camps, the implications of policy 
adoption or typologies meant to differentiate between types and explain their occurrence.1 
In spite of the extensive literature devoted to particular components of ethnonational identities, 
little attention has been paid to the reasons referendums on ethnic topics are initiated. To address this 
gap in the literature, our article analyzes the decisions of referendum initiators to make interethnic 
issues the object of popular votes. The central argument is that this particular type of referendum can be 
best understood if analyzed through the lens of a typology with two analytical dimensions: approach 
towards the status quo (maintaining vs. change) and strategic behavior of the initiators (agenda-setting 
vs. policy legitimation). Our qualitative empirical analysis uses document analysis of secondary data to 
identify the causes that determined the choice of the initiators in five referendums in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The region is an appropriate setting to study this type of referendum due to the 
existence of multiple ethnicities within state borders, with many long-lasting interethnic issues on the 
political agenda. We closely investigate all five referendums called on interethnic relations, aimed 
either at difference elimination or difference managing,2 which are in chronological order the 
following: voting rights for non-citizens (Estonia, 1992), naturalization (Latvia, 1998), dual citizenship 
(Hungary, 2004), restoring basic rights to ethnic minorities who had been erased from the citizen 
registry (Slovenia 2004) and Russian as a second official language (Latvia, 2012). We excluded all 
independence referendums and those on border territorial disputes since they refer more to state 
formation or inter-state relations rather than inter-ethnic relations within a society.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the literature dealing 
with reasons for which initiators call for a referendum and provides an original typology. Next we 
provide an overview of the five analyzed referendums, with some useful background details to better 
understand their topics. The third section includes an empirical analysis and comparatively assesses the 
similarities and differences between the five referendums. This section also discusses the most 
important implications of the findings. 
 
 
THE DRIVERS FOR INTERETHNIC REFERENDUMS 
 
Referendums involve ordinary citizens in the decision-making process by providing them the 
opportunity to vote directly on a public issue, a policy or the content of a law without the mediation of 
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state institutions.3 The choice that citizens have to make is framed in terms of proposals aimed either at 
maintaining the status quo or pitted against it.  The role of referendums in contemporary political 
systems is subject to extensive debate. One group of scholars explains that giving voice to ordinary 
citizens on important state matters is problematic due to the public’s lack of competence and 
understanding, which leave room to elite manipulation. In referendums, citizens become vulnerable to 
politicians and interest groups, but also to populist and radical discourses, mostly due to their lack of 
information and poor understanding of the policies to be voted upon.4 A different strand of literature 
argues that referendums are a means to bring more legitimacy to the decision-making process, improve 
the quality of democracy, make changes more rapidly and expand the debate to the entire demos rather 
than limiting it to the political elites.5 This line of enquiry emphasizes the positive impact of 
referendums on the political system, with key features that could compensate for the failures of 
representative democracy. 
Rich empirical evidence from around the world supports each of these arguments, showing how 
the use of referendums can vary broadly between being another weapon in the hands of political elites 
and making the people count in the decision-making process.6 Most referendums are positioned 
between these two extremes, displaying a combination of features that bring them closer to either the 
manipulation end of the spectrum or to the genuine voice of the public. Earlier research indicated that 
institutional factors – the timing, design of the referendums or intervention of external actors – can 
make a difference with respect to the outcome.7 In addition to these features, it is essential to know the 
reasons behind the initiation of referendums to understand why some topics make the object of popular 
votes. Previous research has indicated that political actors often use referendums to achieve their 
goals.8 The most prominent goals identified in the literature are attempts to solve intra- or inter-
institutional disputes, decouple controversial issues from elections for government, advance the 
legislative agenda, gain legitimacy for fundamental changes or extend public electoral support.9  
When narrowing down the scope of analysis to interethnic referendums, the institutionally 
related reasons have limited applicability. There were situations in which popular votes were used to 
solve internal party disputes or were the ultimate solution to situations in which state institutions 
collided.10 However, most of these referendums had broad and quite technical topics, related to the 
performance and characteristics of institutions, very far from the specificity of issues of interethnic 
relations. Such topics were usually highly divisive and mobilizing at the level of the entire society. We 
argue that the remaining motives can be clustered in two broad categories: approach towards the status 
quo and policy-oriented goals, which are briefly articulated in the following two sub-sections.  
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Approach Towards the Status Quo 
The first category is straightforward and lies at the core of decisions in referendums. The referendum is 
a choice between (usually two) policy alternatives, out of which one is (usually) the status quo. The 
latter is the default solution that provide voters with a point of reference to assess how risky or costly 
moving away from the status quo is.11 Accordingly, the status quo is often at an advantage due to a 
certain degree of uncertainty involved by the change. It is unclear whether the new alternatives will 
achieve the promised outcomes or if they might have negative consequences that are not envisaged.12 
The status quo bias is higher among poorly informed citizens because the status quo will be better 
known than the new policy.13 Their expectations about the new policy are low and they are risk averse.   
 These propositions suggest that proposals for change face on average considerably more 
opposition compared to the protection of the status quo. Interethnic relations augment the challenges 
because they are sensitive issues, with the potential to be highly divisive, and with consequences on 
multiple layers. As such, the perceived uncertainty of a new policy and fears that things may go in the 
unwanted direction can be quite high among particular segments in society. Under these circumstances, 
a safe bet for a referendum initiator is to go for a popular vote in which the status quo is preserved. To 
stand a good chance when going against the status quo, the initiator has to advertise the changes as 
bringing a general advantage to society, either in the form of a more progressive / liberal policy or in 
the form of solving past conflicts.  
We propose this analytical dimension for two reasons. First, in addition to its simplicity and 
general applicability, there is a balance between the possible approaches of the initiators. With 
referendums on constitutional amendments or powers of state institutions, the theoretical expectation is 
– and empirical evidence supports it – that most referendums are called to change the status quo. 
Second, the likelihood of a contagion effect is fairly limited. For referendums on political system, 
moral values or economic issues, there is a learning process that can be observed longitudinally (if the 
country has a series of referendums) or cross-nationally, when countries learn from their neighbors. 
Since interethnic relations are often country specific, the contagion effect is unlikely to occur. It is 
difficult to predict, based on past experiences of other countries, which way one referendum will be 
initiated.   
 
The Policy Dimension: Agenda-Setting and Legitimation 
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The idea of agenda-setting playing a role in referendums is not new. In their comprehensive review of 
the literature Simon Hug and George Tsebelis show the importance of agenda-setting for the outcome. 
The agenda-setter can influence the result by “sequencing appropriately the questions and exploiting 
the different preferences among the different individual actors.”14 This conclusion is re-enforced by 
research showing that voting in many referendums involves heuristics from the side of the citizens who 
expect and follow cues provided by political parties.15 In a similar way, agenda-setting is relevant to 
explaining the decision to initiate the referendum, not only to shape its outcome. Referendums provide 
political actors the opportunity to advance their own ideas, and promote their political agenda.16 This 
happens in two ways. First, referendums allow parties to take their ideas outside the parliamentary 
arena, avoiding the political debate that usually surrounds controversial issues, and eventually bypass 
an adversarial parliamentary majority, that is when supporters of the political idea are in a minority. 
Political parties use referendums to promote their interests, sometimes with little consultation with the 
general public or with those directly impacted on by the referendum outcome. A comparative study of 
Guatemala, Iraq and Cyprus reveals how in these three countries referendums aiming to bring relevant 
changes to the constitution or to state structures lacked stakeholder consultation.17 As such, there are 
situations in which political parties organize referendums in isolation from the opinions of political 
opponents and important constituencies, aiming mainly to pursue their own agenda.  
Second, a referendum provides a good opportunity for marginal political players to promote 
their ideas that would otherwise be less prominent in electoral competitions, as in the Italian case.18 In 
some cases, political parties in opposition use referendums to bring back to the political agenda issues 
that they own but could not achieve while in government. Furthermore, referendums can be used by 
non-political actors to bring issues to the agenda.19 The 2015 referendum in Slovakia banning same-sex 
marriage was initiated by a conservative church-backed group called Alliance for Family, which 
gathered the required number of signatures to initiate a popular vote on the issue.20  
Political elites also use referendums to foster legitimacy in general and the legitimacy of their 
policies in particular. Legitimacy in general is enhanced by legislative provisions and by use of 
referendums: earlier studies have shown that when people have a say in the decision-making process 
through direct democracy, either on paper or in practice, they have a higher level of subjective regime 
legitimacy, that is accepting and supporting the state authorities.21 Research on peace referendums and 
power-sharing settlements argue that giving people a voice is crucial for the legitimacy of the new 
institutions especially when facing divisions between groups along ethnonational lines.22 The direct 
involvement of citizens could counter-balance the selfish interests of elites, that is power or rent-
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seeking opportunities,23 which may conflict with the general interests of those affected by the 
institutional change. In the specific case of power-sharing, its approval in a referendum with consent 
from the main groups in a divided society is equivalent to high legitimacy24 that goes beyond elite self-
interests. An illustrative comparison of this mechanism is between the Northern Irish referendum on the 
Good Friday Agreement and 2004 referendum in Cyprus. In Northern Ireland, the public was involved 
and informed throughout the process starting with the election of the parties to negotiate the agreement 
and ending with the voting.25 In the unsuccessful Cyprus referendum, the Annan Plan was negotiated 
secretively between political elites, the public was poorly involved before voting on the outcome and 
thus did not support the initiative.26  
The legitimacy of policies in referendums follow the principle according to which the publicly 
expressed consent of citizens confers legitimacy on an action. Politicians strive to win a policy debate 
when they believe that the people favor their position.27 For example, the 2015 referendum in Greece 
against accepting the EU and IMF financial bailout was used by the prime minister and governing 
parties to strengthen their agenda and legitimize their position.28 Research shows how the policy-
oriented approach of the parties towards referendums is not limited to their own interests. In response 
to the increasingly observed political alienation of citizens, German political parties adopted direct 
democracy regulations meant to encourage public decision-making and specific types of political 
activity.29 Their goal was to ensure the legitimacy of the system. The pursuit of any of these goals 
ensures visibility and publicity for the initiator. They are in the spotlight and can capitalize on the 
image gained during the referendum. The popularity of political actors usually translates into electoral 
support, which can be either the direct goal of a referendum or a positive externality.   
These arguments indicate how referendums can be a function of the approach towards the status 
quo and attempt to pursue different policy goals. The two are not mutually exclusive and it is quite 
common for an initiator to seek the achievement of several goals. Figure 1 presents a two-by-two 
matrix that clusters on two dimensions the reasons for which interethnic referendums may be initiated. 
The first dimension is the approach towards the status quo and distinguishes between maintaining or 
altering the existing context, while the second refers to policies and has agenda-setting and policy 
legitimation as the two main strategies. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
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To illustrate the applicability of the typology, this article applies it to five referendums in 
Central and Eastern Europe on minority rights and citizenship. The following section provides 
the contextual information for these popular votes and emphasizes the reasons behind the 
initiators’ decision to call them.  
 
 
FIVE REFERENDUMS ON MINORITY RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP 
 
These referendums were conducted between 1992 and 2012 in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia. 
In terms of initiator, two of them were top-down, called by the political elites (Estonia, 1992 and 
Slovenia, 2004), while the remaining three were bottom-up and had as a basis the collection of 
signatures from ordinary citizens (Hungary, 2004, Slovenia, 2004 and Latvia, 2012). The latter 
category is a bit more complex since sometimes the signature collection is organized and coordinated 
by political parties rather than citizens alone (for example Latvia, 2012). Even then, they still fall under 
the category of bottom-up referendums due to the avenue used to trigger it. With respect to divisions in 
society, three of the analyzed referendums were quite divisive as illustrated by their tight results. The 
referendums organized in 1992 in Estonia and in 1998 in Latvia had a narrow majority shifting the 
balance (53%), while for the referendum in 2004 in Hungary the distribution of votes was even tighter 
(51% to 49% of those who voted); in the latter case turnout was influenced, as we will see below, by a 
strategic move of the government. In the remaining two referendums the vote either coincided with the 
ethnic division of the country or it was a sweeping victory by one of the sides. These two instances 
confirm earlier observations according to which referendums are not very useful when applied to issues 
running along the major divisions in society.30 
The following subsections describe in detail the road to each of the referendums, the reasons 
behind their organization and the key arguments used during the campaign. We present them in near  
chronological order, the exception to the rule being the 2012 Latvian referendum that is introduced 
immediately after the 1998 referendum in the same country. 
 
The 1992 Estonian Referendum on Voting Rights for Non-Citizens 
The citizenship debate between liberal and conservative camps emerged in Estonia at the end of the 
1980s as the national independence movement gained momentum. The conservatives emphasized the 
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drastic changes in the ethnic composition of Estonia’s population due to a solid influx of Russian-
speaking immigrants during the Soviet regime. In 1949 the share of non-Estonians was around 10%, in 
1989 it had reached an unprecedented level of 38.5%. In 1992, the conservative camp eventually won 
the debate on citizenship that resulted in the re-enactment of the Citizenship Act in February 1992 that 
was based on the principle of the restitution of the pre-1940 citizenship. According to it, only pre-1940 
nationals and their descendants, regardless of their ethnic identification, were eligible to obtain 
Estonian citizenship by simple registration. Those Estonians who had settled in Estonia after 1940, 
along with their descendants, were required to follow a set naturalization path.31 In the spring of 1992, 
the main issues of debate in the Estonian parliament were the constitution and citizenship laws. 
Parliament decided to subject the draft constitution to a referendum as well as the question of whether 
people who applied for citizenship should be allowed to vote in the following parliamentary elections.32 
The representatives of the Russian-speaking population perceived the legislation as 
discriminatory and believed that the conditions for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship would create 
a segregated society and impose permanent restrictions on the civil rights of nearly 40% of Estonia's 
residents. Estonian officials, on the other hand, considered that by international standards, the law 
included extremely liberal naturalization procedures.33 However, the fact that this question was put to a 
vote raised problems for Estonia on the international arena. The decision was broadly interpreted as 
discrimination against Russians residing in Estonia and a violation of their human rights. At the time, 
the number of applicants for citizenship was quite small, only around 5,000 persons.34 
The political parties with a more nationalist discourse, such as the Estonian National 
Independence Party, the Conservatives and the Liberals, argued for the re-establishment of the 1938 
constitution. The main question of disagreement was the definition of who should have the right to 
vote. More moderate politicians of the Centre Party and the Estonian Democratic Labor Party took the 
stance that all residents of Estonia should be included in the referendum vote, whereas the more 
nationalist–minded blocs wanted only Estonian nationals to participate. “The prevailing viewpoint 
was that only Estonian citizens should have the right to make decisions concerning the Estonian 
state. Moreover, the majority of non-citizens had voted against independence in the referendum 
on independence.”35 In the end, the Russian-speaking population of 500,000 (out of the country’s total 
population of 1.5 million) was not allowed to participate.36 The left centrists recommended a “Yes” 
vote while the right centrists advised the population to vote “No.” The question was largely 
misunderstood by the public who interpreted the vote as whether or not to give non-Estonians 
citizenship.37 The ballot was rejected by about 53% of the citizens who turned out. 
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The 1998 Latvian referendum on citizenship 
Among the countries analyzed in this article, Latvia is the only one which held a referendum on ethno-
national issues twice: in 1998 and 2012. Citizenship was granted in accordance with the 1991 
Resolution according to which those who were Latvian citizens before 1940 and their descendants had 
the right to register as citizens. Those who arrived in Latvia during the Soviet period had the option to 
become naturalized according to the 1994 Citizenship Law.38 However, under the Citizenship Law only 
6% applied for citizenship until 1998 due to the “window system,” according to which the numbers of 
those who could apply for citizenship was limited until 2003 on the basis of age criteria, with priority 
given to younger age groups.39 
The citizenship status affects various aspects of life: voting, occupation and residence. In Latvia 
non-citizens are neither allowed to vote in any type of elections nor to establish a political party. 
Besides this, they have been prohibited from holding state office, serving as judges or barristers, and 
taking part in diplomatic and consular service. Apart from this, non-citizens have been prohibited from 
owning land and other natural resources. In addition, they have received fewer privatization vouchers 
and a smaller pension. This all contributed to their perception as “second class” residents.40 The issue 
of citizenship also played an essential role during the campaign for the 1993 parliamentary election. 
Proposals from parties ranged from repatriation of all Soviet-era settlers to a zero option.41 By 
December 1997, as Latvia failed to gain entry to the first level of EU accession talks due to the slow 
progress of naturalization, the country's president became a vocal supporter for liberalization of 
citizenship laws. 
In June 1998, parliament approved the government’s proposal to abolish the naturalization 
windows, grant citizenship at birth to stateless children and  simplify the naturalization procedures for 
persons over 65 years.42 The regulations concerning the status of the unemployed were amended to 
permit job seekers to register with the State Employment Service (SES) and obtain unemployment 
benefits without proof of knowledge of Latvian.43 The nationalist party, For Fatherland and Freedom / 
Latvian National Independence Party (TB/LNNK), in government at the time, delayed the 
promulgation of the new June 1998 amendments until it was clear whether or not the public would 
decide on the amendments through a referendum. The party was successful in collecting signatures 
from 10% of the eligible voters for an initiative to support a popular vote.44 
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The president campaigned against the TB/LNNK sponsored referendum, arguing that it would 
both further damage relations with Russia and hinder Latvia’s progress towards EU membership.45 The 
TB/LNNK was not united over the issue of the citizenship law. On the one hand, it actively 
campaigned for signatures to launch a referendum and then subsequently demanded other changes, 
such as eliminating citizenship for special achievements and reintroducing a quota for naturalization. 
On the other hand, the prime minister, a representative of the TB/LNNK, declared that easing the 
citizenship requirements would facilitate EU membership and serve Latvia’s strategic interests. The 
conservative and nationalist People’s Party as well as Latvia’s Way strongly opposed the referendum, 
viewing EU accession primarily as a security issue. The union, For Human Rights in a United Latvia, 
created by the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party and the Equal Rights Movement in May 
1998 also fully supported the facilitated naturalization and all OSCE recommendations. Latvia was 
subjected to intense pressure from the Russian Federation and the international community to liberalize 
the country's citizenship law. The referendum on amendments to the citizenship law was held on the 
same day as the parliamentary election, on 3 October 1998.46 Although the referendum campaign 
contributed to a strengthened feeling of insecurity among minorities, 53% of citizens voted for the 
liberalization of naturalization exams, the rights of non-citizens' children to be granted Latvian 
citizenship and the abolition of age quotas for naturalization.47 
 
The 2012 Latvian Constitutional Referendum on Russian as a Second Official Language 
Russian is the native language for more than a quarter of Latvia’s two million population, making up 
the second largest ethnic group in the country. Several laws were passed by parliament to support and 
strengthen the use of the Latvian language. In general, there are two different discourses of the ethno-
cultural nation of Latvia: Latvians do not see the Russian-speaking inhabitants as part of the Latvian 
nation, while the Russian-speaking inhabitants view themselves as loyal and belonging to Latvia.48 
Tensions escalated after the parliamentary elections in 2011 when a pro-Russia party, Harmony Centre, 
became the largest force, winning 31 of the total of 100 seats. It was left out of the coalition 
government formed by three center-right political parties belonging to the majority population. Since 
this party had always been perceived as Russian and strongly influenced by Moscow, it had never been 
invited into the government despite its success in parliamentary elections.49 Latvian parties consider 
Harmony Centre as “a Trojan horse for the Kremlin.”50 
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The referendum itself was a reaction to the attempt of the National Alliance, formed after the 
merger between All for Latvia! and TB/LNNK, to make Latvian the only language of instruction in 
public schools. This political party, in opposition at the time, started a petition for a referendum, but 
failed to collect the required number of signatures.51 A counter-initiative to collect signature for a 
nationwide referendum was initiated by the non-governmental organization, Mother Tongue. The 
signature-collecting campaign suffered from a lack of progress until Harmony Centre lined up behind 
it.52 This pro-Russian movement managed to collect over 187,000 signatures, that is more than 12% of 
voters, to launch a public vote on the matter, thus forcing the Latvian government to organize a 
nationwide referendum on Russian as the second state language.53 
Initially distant from the referendum initiatives, political parties later became active supporters 
of the two camps. For instance, in the beginning the initiative for Russian as the second official state 
language was supported only by the party, For Human Rights in United Latvia, that had articulated the 
interests of the Russian-speaking population for many years, but had failed to win any seats in the last 
parliamentary elections. The situation changed after one of the leaders of Harmony Centre and the 
incumbent Mayor of Riga, Nils Ushakov, announced that he had signed the petition. Afterwards, other 
important party members followed Ushakov’s example. In the referendum Harmony Centre supported a 
"Yes" vote, while the President and Prime Minister of Latvia campaigned for a "No" vote.54 The 
country's president first claimed he would not take part in the referendum, then a few weeks before the 
vote he announced that he would take part in it, but still described the referendum as "absurd," saying 
that most people are preoccupied by more serious topics - such as recovery from a recession. Besides, 
he stressed that the government had already been funding language schools for minorities, that is for 
Russian-speakers.55 
The referendum campaign was very emotional and polarizing, resulting in the second-highest 
turnout of voters in a popular vote (71.12%). According to the Latvian legislation, in order to make 
amendments to the Constitution through a referendum an approval quorum of 50% had to be met. 
Taking this into consideration, and the proportion of Latvian and Russian speaking voters, there were 
no rational grounds to expect the referendum to pass.56 There was a consensus among the Latvian 
political elites, religious associations and civil society about this referendum. Their shared position was 
that the Latvian language was the foundation of national identity, of the state and its sovereignty.57 
Latvia’s top political leaders, the four Latvian parliamentary parties (three in government and one in 
opposition), non-governmental organizations, intelligentsia associations, the Lutheran and Catholic 
church hierarchies, the Jewish community and the rabbinical authority urged voters to turn out and vote 
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“No.” On the oppositional side stood Harmony Centre, the fringe-nationalist National Bolshevik party 
and the Russian Orthodox Metropolitanate urging Russian voters to support the referendum.58 The 
outcome of the referendum was “arithmetically predetermined.”59 The vote clearly mirrored the 
linguistic and ethnic lines in Latvian society: around 75% voted against and 25% in favor, 
corresponding with the proportion of Latvians and Russians / Russophones among Latvia’s citizens.60 
According to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, there are about 72% ethnic Latvians, 
20% ethnic Russians and 9% other ethnicities in Latvia.61 
 
The 2004 Hungarian Referendum on Dual Citizenship 
On 5 December 2004, less than half a year after its accession to the EU, Hungary held a referendum to 
grant dual citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living outside their homeland. The novelty of this proposal 
was not the dual citizenship itself since it had long been available for permanent residents within the 
country, but rather removing residency requirements as a pre-condition for obtaining Hungarian second 
citizenship. Ethnic Hungarians abroad were to be granted Hungarian citizenship merely by declaring 
themselves as being of Hungarian linguistic affiliation or by confirming their Hungarian ethnicity. The 
proposal was directed at external minorities – Hungarian diaspora elsewhere in the world. Taking into 
consideration that the number of ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring states was estimated at around 
three million and the population of Hungary at that time was about 10 million, and assuming that the 
majority of those would actually claim citizenship, “the proportions of the resulting change would 
exceed the growth of Germany’s citizenry after unification, but of course, without the corresponding 
territorial enlargement.”62 The logic of the Hungarian trans-border dual citizenship initiative was 
fundamentally different from that applied in Western Europe. In the latter, dual citizenship is used to 
integrate labor migrants into their country of immigration, thus decoupling citizenship from ethnicity. 
The Hungarian case, in contrast, represents a counter-trend of re-linking citizenship with ethnicity.63 
The initiative to call for a referendum came from outside the Hungarian political establishment. 
A radical and rather marginal NGO dedicated to the protection of the Hungarian diaspora, the World 
Federation of Hungarians, came up with the idea. No political actor would take the risk of launching an 
initiative that had very limited support within Hungary itself. The NGO succeeded in obtaining the 
200,000 signatures necessary for putting its proposal to the ballot.64 Initially, the Hungarian political 
parties reacted very cautiously to the initiative. After several months the mainstream rightwing parties 
(FIDESZ and MDF) along with the President of the Republic declared their support for the referendum, 
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while the socialists and liberals took the opposite position.65 The ruling Socialists (MSZP) and their 
junior coalition partners, the liberal Free Democrats (SZDSZ), were against the proposal, while the 
opposition parties Young Democrats-Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) and Democratic Forum (MDF) 
campaigned for a "Yes" vote.66 
The debate was dominated by two great discourses: the "Yes" camp with emphasis on moralism, 
historicism and emotional exaltation and the "No" camp with a universalist discourse.67 The political 
debates on the referendum within Hungary were highly polarized between the nationalist right as 
supporters and the Europe-oriented opponents.68 The advocates of the referendum argued that their 
view was based on concepts of an integrated Europe of the future, a de-territorialized world. They 
emphasized that European states accept ethnicity as part of the basis of citizenship, applying a 
particularly relevant example of Silesian Germans who, from the early 1990s, were able to obtain 
German passports in addition to their Polish ones without having residence in Germany. The two 
mainstream rightwing parties underlined the need to recreate a "unitary Hungarian nation" over and 
above existing state borders.69 The possible dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians, especially when 
Viktor Orban linked the issue to greater autonomy for them in neighboring states, met with great 
disapproval from the states concerned as a threat to their sovereignty.70 
The "No" camp used welfare protectionism as argument since, apart from Slovakia, the living 
standards of trans-border Hungarians were way below those in Hungary. The Socialist Party 
emphasized primarily the costs of the reform. They estimated that 800,000 ethnic Hungarians might 
migrate to Hungary in the case of a successful referendum, leading to an additional 2.9 billion dollars 
in welfare expenditures each year.71 Another important motive for a "No" vote could have been the fear 
of instability at the borders due to potential conflicts with Hungary’s neighbors. In addition, voters 
might have been influenced by the perception that dual citizenship would eventually lead to voting 
rights, thus, allowing those who do not live in the country influence over its politics. Mass 
enfranchisement of a new electorate could introduce new uncertainties into the system and lead to an 
internal destabilization of Hungary's relatively young transitional democracy.72 The result was invalid 
since only about 37% of the eligible voters participated in the referendum. Among these, the 51% in 
favor were not sufficient to meet the approval quorum of 25% of registered voters.73 This result was 
mainly due to the strategic behavior of the "No" camp, which urged people to stay at home since the 
referendum required an approval quorum. 
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The 2004 Slovenian Referendum on Restoring Basic Rights to Ethnic Minorities 
After a one-week conflict with the federal army, Slovenia rapidly distanced itself from the crisis in the 
former Yugoslavia and unilaterally declared its independence on 25 June 1991.74 Though Slovenia had 
no historical heritage of independent statehood,75 it succeeded in establishing itself as a promising 
candidate for EU accession, being often characterized as an example of human rights protection and 
respect for the rule of law with its functioning state apparatus. The only spot on this idyllic picture was 
the case of the so-called erased people (mostly Croats, Bosnians and Serbs). The Slovenian law on 
Citizenship from June 1991 stated that individuals from other republics who had lawful residence in 
Slovenia on the day of the independence referendum could become Slovenian citizens upon request 
within six months.76 As a result of this brief window of opportunity that was allowed in 1992, around 
18,000 non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia who remained in Slovenia after independence 
were administratively removed from the official records after they failed to apply for citizenship or 
permanent resident status. As a consequence, they were systematically denied driver's licenses, access 
to state health care and pensions.77 
In March 2003, the Constitutional Court found this regulation unconstitutional and decided that 
those who had had their permanent residence approved in the meantime (from 1992 to 2003) should 
also obtain this status retroactively for the period from 1992 onwards. The restoration of basic rights to 
ethnic minorities was in line with the EU requirements and recommendations, and was quite a salient 
issue at the time since the accession was planned the following year. The Ministry of Interior was 
assigned the task of preparing a law to implement the decision of the Constitutional Court. On this 
basis, two opposing political camps emerged: the governing Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the 
United List of Social Democrats favored the proposal, while the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), 
New Slovenia, Slovenian National Party together with the Slovene People’s Party (member of the 
governing coalition) opposed it.78 The polarization of the political scene and public opinion over the 
topic led to various interpretations of the Constitutional Court decision.79 In protest at the government’s 
attempts to regulate the issue of the erased, the main opposition party (SDS) initiated a campaign to 
collect signatures from the Members of Parliament and succeeded in calling a referendum on 4 April 
2004.80 According to Article 168 of the Slovenian Constitution, “a proposal to initiate the procedure for 
amending the Constitution may be made by twenty deputies of the National Assembly, the Government 
or at least thirty thousand voters.”81 
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The parliamentary debates over these bills raised concerns about the stability of the Centre Left 
government since the coalition and opposition were divided over the issue of restoring the status of the 
erased. As the crisis heated up the Slovenian President, Janez Drnovšek, interfered and urged all parties 
to abandon the idea of holding a referendum since, “although it could not overturn a Constitutional 
Court decision, would nonetheless create further division and encourage nationalist passions.”82 
Nevertheless, campaigners, led by some members of the opposition, openly articulated that the decision 
of the Constitutional Court should not be respected. Furthermore, “they spread ethnic hatred and 
mistrust by claiming that the Erased were non-Slovenes who did not want Slovene citizenship.”83 
Slovenia's nationalists argued that after restoring rights to the erased the country would be forced to pay 
enormous sums for compensation claims.84 The paradox of this referendum was reflected in the fact 
that “a majority voted on an issue concerning a minority which was ineligible to vote.”85 This vote was 
accompanied by public protests and calls for a boycott, which was supported  by the government. In the 
end, the voter turnout was lower than one third and the proposal to restore basic rights was rejected by 
almost 95% of those who voted.86 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
These descriptions of the five referendums indicate the existence of one major reason behind every 
referendum. They populate three out of the four cells of the matrix and provide room for fruitful 
comparisons. The two referendums on agenda-setting were the ones in Hungary (2004) and Latvia 
(2012). They both tried to change the status quo with the help of issues that were not originally on the 
agenda. The Hungarian referendum was triggered by an idea that was nearly incomprehensible in the 
broader context of the EU. The expansion of Hungarian citizenship went against that of a Union 
without borders in which citizenship is meant to be transnational (that is European and less national-
based). Hungary had become an EU member state in the year of the referendum, while the neighboring 
countries with important Hungarian diasporas were either members (Slovakia) or set on the path for 
accession (Romania, 2007 and Croatia, 2013). These are the circumstances that explain the absence of 
the topic of Hungarian citizenship from the political agenda before being pushed by an NGO. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
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The Latvian referendum (2012) was also intended to bring about a change with an issue on which the 
initiators could not claim ownership. As described, it was a reaction to the initiative of the National 
Alliance to remove Russian as a language of instruction from public schools. The pro-Russian 
movement initiating the referendum came with a counter-proposal in which Russian was supposed to 
become a second state language. Such an issue was not in the spotlight until then, although the 1998 
referendum was positive for ethnic minorities. When putting this issue on the agenda, the supporters of 
the referendum considered it as “an outgrowth of longstanding divisions and historically unequal 
treatment for the country’s large minority of native Russian speakers.”87 For ethnic Latvians the 
proposal was, in contrast, “an attempt to encroach on Latvia's independence, which was restored two 
decades ago after half a century of occupation by the Soviet Union.”88 Furthermore, the "No" camp 
used the slogan “Latvia is for Latvians,” arguing that “Russians have Russia, Latvians-Latvia, Swedes-
Sweden etc..” Russians in Latvia were discursively framed as occupants, using the expression that their 
“grandfathers and grandmothers came here with tanks.”89 Moreover, the question arose: “if Latvians 
had to know Russian during the Soviet era, why don’t Russians now know Latvian after 20 years of an 
independent Latvia?”90 
The referendums in Latvia (1998) and Slovenia (2004) were aimed at maintaining the status 
quo. In Latvia, the opposition, animated by nationalist discourse, tried to block these aims with the help 
of the government-initiated referendum to alter the status of non-Latvian citizens. The executive 
planned to liberalize the naturalization exams, provide non-citizens' children the right to be granted 
Latvian citizenship and abolish age quotas for naturalization. The policy legitimization attempt of the 
opposition signaled that the status quo was preferred; the government took some steps in that direction 
and used a popular vote to ensure the status quo maintenance. In Slovenia, the reform initiated by the 
Ministry of Interior, following the verdict that a provision in the existing law was unconstitutional, was 
blocked by the main opposition party SDS. To legitimize its position on the issue of basic rights for 
ethnic minorities, the SDS initiated a referendum through the required number of signatures from 
parliamentarians. The result of the referendum was favorable to the SDS.  An indication of its 
legitimizing of the party's policy position was major electoral success for the SDS in the parliamentary 
elections organized in the same year. 
Estonia and Latvia are the only two former Soviet republics that did not introduce the zero 
option of citizenship after independence. According to the zero option principle all current residents of 
the state's territory are granted citizenship without the need to go through a process of naturalization.91 
Their presence in different cells of Figure 1 with the referendums organized on citizenship topics is not 
17 
 
surprising if we consider that the Estonian referendum was the one initiated by the government to bring 
reforms, while in Latvia it was a referendum opposing similar government reforms. The 1992 
referendum in Estonia was meant to legitimize the new state policy on citizenship after the country 
gained its independence. 
This article aimed to identify the reasons behind the initiation of referendums on ethno-national 
issues in Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis of all five referendums conducted between 1992 and 
2012 indicates that the initiators, either coming from the political elites or from outside the 
establishment, had two main goals: setting the political agenda and providing legitimacy for their own 
policies. Equally important, there is a balance between referendums called for the preservation of the 
status quo and those for its change. This is in line with the theoretical discussion preceding the 
presentation of the case studies, according to which a balanced approach towards the status quo is 
expected in these cases.  
One major theoretical implication of these findings is that the call for ethno-national 
referendums can be understood if looking at their approach towards the status quo and policy related 
goals. Although tested for five referendums, the typology proposed in this article is not geographically 
and politically confined to the Central and East European space. Its theoretical origins are general and 
broadly applicable and the limited empirical evidence from this study is mainly due to space 
constraints. We believe that this typology can be a useful starting point for a systematic analysis of 
reasons to initiate referendums with an ethnic dimension. This parsimonious categorization paves the 
way for a better understanding of the logic of this type of popular vote by in-depth scrutiny of 
contextual factors, allowing at the same time for cross-country and longitudinal comparisons. The 
empirical implication of this article is the observation that highly divisive issues do not appear to make 
a difference in terms of initiation. Although there were theoretical reasons to expect that controversial 
issues and general consensus issues are approached differently by initiators, the empirical evidence 
reveals the contrary. The summary in Figure 2 includes in the same cell a controversial issue (Latvia, 
1998) and one with general consensus (Slovenia, 2004). 
Further research can expand the scope of the analysis and include cases from Western Europe to 
see whether the results are robust in a broader comparison. This would contribute to the empirical merit 
of the study by providing a guide map for policy-makers about the experiences of this particular type of 
popular vote. At the same time, qualitative data in the form of interviews with decision-makers could 
nuance the general observations made here. This new type of information could explain in detail if and 
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how the context played a crucial role in deciding in favor of a popular vote to solve interethnic 
relations, which cannot be captured by the type of analysis conducted in this article. 
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